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In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, U.S. law recognized vir-
tually absolute immunity for foreign states sued in U.S. courts.' How-
ever, with the onset of communism in the post World War II era, many
foreign governments began to perform functions traditionally private or
commercial in nature, such as the operation of an airline or commercial
bank.2 As a result of this political change, a new theory of "restrictive
immunity" replaced absolute immunity as the norm in U.S. courts. 3 Con-
gress codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).4
The original FSIA provided sovereign immunity for foreign states
and their instrumentalities, with enumerated exceptions including waiver,
commercial activity, expropriation of property in violation of interna-
tional law, disputes over property situated in the United States, and tor-
tious acts or omissions occurring in the United States.5
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Michigan Law School. The author wishes to thank Professor Rob Howse and David P. Stewart,
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1. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. 116, 137-38 (1812); Berizzi Bros. Co. v.
S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
2. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing S.
SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); W.
Friedmann, Changing Social Arrangements in State-Trading States and Their Effect on International
Law, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 350 (1959)).
3. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Acting U.S. Att'y
General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952). The
Tate Letter sets forth the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, whereby sovereigns are not im-
mune for certain private acts.
4. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides the following:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the
time of enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 21, 1976] a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as pro-
vided in sections 1605-1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 2002).
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In 1996, in response to the lobbying of victims of terrorism, includ-
ing the families of victims of Pan Am Flight 103, Congress amended the
FSIA 6 by creating a state-sponsored terrorism exception to foreign sover-
eign immunity ("Antiterrorism Amendment"), stating that a foreign state
has no immunity from U.S. courts in any cases:
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money dam-
ages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death
that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or re-
sources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if
such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an offi-
cial, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, except that the
court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph-
(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 24050)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at the time the act occurred, unless
later so designated as a result of such act or the act is related to Case
Number 1:00CV03 1 10(EGS) in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia; and
(B) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if-
(i) the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has
been brought and the claimant has not afforded the foreign state a
reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with ac-
cepted international rules of arbitration; or
(ii) neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the United
States (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act [8 USCS § 1101(a)(22)]) when the act
upon which the claim is based occurred.7
This new exception to foreign sovereign immunity waived a juris-
dictional barrier previously encountered by plaintiffs seeking to sue des-
ignated foreign states or their instrumentalities for acts of terrorism.8
6. § 1605(a)(7).
7. Id.
8. See Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffrey Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State
Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments To the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87
GEO. L.J. 675,677 (1999).
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Five months later, Congress amended the FSIA again with the
"Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism" provision, com-
monly referred to as the Flatow Amendment.9 The Flatow Amendment is
named after Alisa Flatow, a Brandeis University student killed by a ter-
rorist attack while traveling on a bus in the Gaza Strip when a suicide
bomber drove a van full of explosives into the bus.' 0 Outraged by his
daughter's suffering and determined to seek justice for victims of state-
sponsored terrorism, Alisa's father, Stephen Flatow, lobbied Congress to
pass the resulting legislation."1 The Amendment provides punitive dam-
ages, previously unavailable under the statutory scheme of the FSIA:
An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism ... while acting within the scope of his or
her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United States
national or the national's legal representative for personal injury or
death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which
the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1605(a)(7) of Title 28, United States Code, for money damages
which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffer-
ing, and punitive damages if the acts were among those described in
section 1605(a)(7).12
In the years since the enactment of the Flatow Amendment, courts
have struggled with the question of whether the Amendment creates a
private cause of action against a foreign state itself, or only against an
official, employee, or agent of a foreign state.' 3 Many courts have found
that the Flatow Amendment does provide a cause of action against a for-
eign state itself.14 Other courts have determined, correctly in the author's
9. Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 2002)).
10. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998).
11. See Richard T. Micco, Putting the Terrorist-Sponsoring State in the Dock: Recent Changes
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Individual's Recourse Against Foreign Powers, 14
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 109, 110 (2000).
12. Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996) (cofified at 28
U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 2002)).
13. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 215 (D.D.C. 2003); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 270-71 (D.D.C. 2003); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 105, 191-92 (D.D.C. 2003); Kerr v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 245 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62-63
(D.D.C. 2003); Kilbum v. Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2003); Pugh v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2003); Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 96-97 (D.D.C. 2003); Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222,
230-31 (D.D.C. 2002); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 166 (D.D.C. 2002);
Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
14. See, e.g., Cronin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 230-3 1; Kilburn, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37.
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view, that the Flatow Amendment only provides a cause of action against
officials, employees, or agents of a foreign state. 15
In its consideration of the Flatow Amendment, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has sought the input of the State Department
on the question of whether the FSIA and the Flatow Amendment provide
a cause of action against a foreign state. 16 However, the Supreme Court
has stated the following: "In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act in order to free the Government from the case by
case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to '[as-
sure] litigants that ... decisions are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process."'' 17 Given the Supreme Court's
view that one purpose of the FSIA was to limit the role of the State De-
partment in determining questions of foreign sovereign immunity,' 8 how
much consideration should the courts give to the position of the State
Department in cases involving foreign policy considerations? Put differ-
ently, what are the limits of the foreign affairs powers of the executive
branch and how might the foreign affairs powers of the executive con-
flict with judicial independence and separation of powers principles? As
this article demonstrates, participation of the executive branch in cases
interpreting the Flatow Amendment and in other cases with serious for-
eign policy implications is appropriate and beneficial for both the courts
and the government of the United States. Indeed, the participation of the
executive branch will bring to the courts unique and valuable expertise in
the arena of foreign policy and help clarify the real world concerns un-
derlying terrorism cases against foreign governments.
This article argues that the Flatow Amendment does not provide a
cause of action against a foreign state itself and, further, that judicial
consultation of the State Department is appropriate and desirable in cases
affecting foreign policy, such as those requiring interpretation of the Fla-
tow Amendment. Part I will analyze early judicial interpretation of the
Flatow Amendment, examine and critique the methodology of Cronin
and its progeny, explain application of the Charming Betsy principle to
this line of cases, and conclude that the Flatow Amendment provides a
cause of action against the officials, employees, or agents of a foreign
15. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 59-61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
16. Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1032-33. The D.C. Circuit recently issued a decision in this
case holding that the Flatow Amendment does not provide a cause of action against a foreign sover-
eign and remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to state a cause of action
under some other source of law. Id. at 1036.
17. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
94-1487, at 7 (1976)).
18. Id.
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state, but not against the foreign state itself. Part II of this paper will ex-
amine the constitutional foundations of the foreign relations power and
its development in U.S. courts, and will explain the benefits of executive
branch participation in cases that interpret the Flatow Amendment and
that affect foreign policy.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FLATOW AMENDMENT
On its face, the Flatow Amendment 9 creates a cause of action
against an official, employee or agent of a foreign state, but not against
the foreign state itself. The slim legislative history of the Flatow
Amendment also offers no support for the proposition that the Amend-
ment creates a cause of action against a foreign state.20 The only lan-
guage in the legislative history that reflects on the purpose or scope of
the Amendment states that the Amendment will expand "the scope of
monetary damage awards available to American victims of international
terrorism."'2' While this language manifests a Congressional intent to
enlarge the scope of available damages for plaintiff victims of state-
sponsored terrorism, it does not clarify the category of defendants against
whom such awards will be available.
A. Early Interpretation of the Flatow Amendment
Judicial interpretation of the Flatow Amendment has evolved over a
period of roughly five years. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran was the
first decision to address the scope of the Flatow Amendment. 22 As ad-
ministrator of Alisa Flatow's estate, Steven Flatow brought a wrongful
death suit against Iran, its intelligence agency, and several of its offi-
cials. 23 The Flatow decision did not resolve the question of the scope of
the cause of action provided by the Flatow Amendment. 24 It did, how-
ever, note that the Flatow Amendment must be interpreted in pari materia
along with the Antiterrorism Amendment: "The amendment should be
considered to relate back to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) as if
they had been enacted as one provision.., and the two provisions should
be construed together and in reference to one another." 25
19. See supra text accompanying note 12.
20. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-863, 104th Cong., at 987 (1996).
21. Id.
22. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id. at 13.
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From this starting point the courts approached the issue rather cau-
tiously.26 Roeder v. islamic Republic of Iran arose from the well-known
hostage-taking crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. 27 Plaintiffs (former
hostages) sought damages from the government of Iran and its Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.28 The district court ultimately dismissed plaintiffs'
claims because the U.S. government had previously negotiated the Al-
giers Accords, an agreement to secure the release of the hostages that
included a provision barring U.S. courts from adjudicating any claims
asserted by the hostages arising out of their captivity in Iran. 29 The court
did, however, address the scope of the cause of action provided by the
Flatow Amendment:
It is mainly this provision on which plaintiffs rest their claim to a
private cause of action against Iran. However, the plain text of this
appropriations rider does not create a cause of action against a for-
eign government that sponsors terrorism-it creates a cause of ac-
tion only against the "official, employee, or agent" of such a state
who participates in the terrorist activity.
30
The court correctly construed the unambiguous text of the Flatow
Amendment and, following the Flatow court's suggestion, interpreted the
Flatow Amendment in pari materia with the Antiterrorism Amendment
and the FSIA generally, and then took note of one particularly relevant
difference in drafting among those provisions:
This conclusion is supported further by another provision of the
FSIA in which Congress actually recognized the difference between
suing a state and suing an official. In the exception for tortious ac-
tivity within United States borders, the statute waives immunity for
lawsuits arising out of "the tortious act or omission of that foreign
state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office or employment.
As clearly noted by the court, Congress recognizes and is aware of
the difference between suing a foreign state itself and suing the agents,
employees or officials of a foreign state. Unless Congress intended to
exclude foreign states from the scope of the cause of action provided by
26. See Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002).
27. Id. at 143-44.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 166. The court also addressed the issue created by Congress's attempt to determine
the outcome of the litigation (in favor of plaintiffs) by emergency legislation. Id. at 145 (discussing
subsection 626(c) of Pub. L. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001)). The court concluded that the legislation
did not abrogate the Algiers Accords. 195 F. Supp. 2d at 166-68.
30. Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d. at 172.
31. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added).
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the Flatow Amendment, there is no reason, other than sloppy drafting,
for Congress to have omitted the language included in § 1605(a)(5). The
courts have no mandate to correct a presumed or perceived mistake in
legislative drafting by reading a cause of action into a statute that on its
face does not provide one. 32 The court correctly perceived this when it
stated the following: "When faced with such sparse explanation of statu-
tory text, the Court must be even more vigilant in its refusal to draw in-
ferences, even desirable inferences, that would fill in the gaps in con-
gressional logic. 3
3
Nevertheless, the Roeder court proceeded to create ambiguity in its
opinion when it stated, "The Court agrees that it is possible to read these
statutory provisions, in the context of legislative history and intent, to
provide for a cause of action against Iran. 34 The court escaped making a
definitive statement on this issue when it decided that the Antiterrorism
Amendment and the Flatow Amendment did not unambiguously abro-
gate the Algiers Accords (which precluded the plaintiffs' claims). 35
B. Cronin and Its Progeny
With the Roeder court having declared the issue ambiguous, the
D.C. Circuit continued to struggle with interpretation of the Flatow
Amendment.36 The recent trend in judicial interpretation has been to find
that the Flatow Amendment does provide a cause of action against a for-
eign state.37 The courts have relied on a variety of factors to justify this
conclusion, with Judge Lamberth's opinion in Cronin v. Islamic Republic
ofIran providing the reasoning most often relied on by other decisions.38
Plaintiff John R. Cronin brought a personal injury action against
Iran for kidnapping and torture by state-sponsored terrorist groups. 39 The
plaintiff, a graduate student in Beirut at the time of the underlying inci-
32. Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d. at 183.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 174.
35. Id. at 175.
36. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(court declined to answer the question).
37. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 215 (D.D.C. 2003); Campuzano v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 270-71 (D.D.C. 2003); Dammarell v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 191-92 (D.D.C. 2003); Kerr v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 59, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2003); Kilburn v. Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2003); Pugh
v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2003); Regier v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 96-97 (D.D.C. 2003); Cronin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230-31 (D.D.C. 2002); Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F.
Supp. 2d 217, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
38. See Cronin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
39. Id. at 223-24.
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dent, alleged that members of a terrorist group, which was organized,
funded, trained and controlled by Iran, had kidnapped him at gunpoint
from a hospital.40 The plaintiff claimed to have been beaten, interrogated
and threatened, and was near death when released four days later. 41
The Cronin opinion follows the principle of interpretation an-
nounced in Flatow, considering the Antiterrorism Amendment and the
Flatow Amendment together.42 Cronin finds that the Antiterrorism
Amendment contains a principle of respondeat superior by which "sov-
ereign immunity of a foreign state will be abrogated if its "official, em-
ployee, or agent" provides material resources to the entity that commits
the terrorist act.",43 The court then transposed this principle to the Flatow
Amendment:
The Flatow Amendment likewise provides that an "official, em-
ployee, or agent" of a foreign state shall be liable if their actions
were taken "while acting within the scope of his or her office, em-
ployment, or agency[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) note. In light of the
identical language used in both statutory provisions, the Court finds
that the respondeat superior implications of section 1605(a)(7) are
equally applicable to the Flatow Amendment. 44
The court's reasoning is flawed in one crucial respect. It fails to dis-
tinguish between a statute that extinguishes sovereign immunity, thereby
conferring jurisdiction under limited circumstances, and an enactment
that goes a step further and provides a cause of action for plaintiffs. The
Flatow Amendment is limited in purpose and scope: While the "em-
ployer" in the respondeat superior sense may not enjoy immunity from
suit, this does not necessarily mean that a subsequent enactment creating
a cause of action only against officials, employees, and agents of that
employer also incorporates an implied cause of action against the em-
ployer itself. Such a construction ignores the careful omission of the lan-
guage "foreign state" from the scope of the cause of action created by the
Flatow Amendment.
The Antiterrorism Amendment is drafted in two parts: First, the
purpose to remove sovereign immunity of foreign states is explicitly
stated; second, the conditions whereby immunity shall be removed are
listed-which includes when an official, employee or agent commits an
offense while acting within the scope of his official duties.45 The Cronin
40. Id. at 225-26.
41. Id. at 227.
42. Id. at 231.
43. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).
44. Id.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. 2002).
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court is mistaken in suggesting that this two-step legislative drafting is
analogous to the Flatow Amendment, which contains only one step by
which it creates a cause of action and provides categories of damages
available to plaintiffs. 4
6
The Cronin court engaged in a teleological argument, insisting that
the purpose of the Antiterrorism Amendment and the Flatow Amend-
ment together must be to provide a cause of action against a foreign
state: "Instead of using the acts of officials, employees, and agents to
support liability against the foreign state, the same language would be
used in the Flatow Amendment to deny victims of state-sponsored terror-
ism a cause of action against the responsible foreign state., 47 This state-
ment makes several unfounded assumptions. First, it assumes that if the
Flatow Amendment does not provide a cause of action against a foreign
state, the Amendment acts somehow to "deny" a cause of action against
a foreign state. This is technically incorrect because the Flatow Amend-
ment does not prohibit any cause of action against a foreign state; in-
deed, a cause of action may yet exist in federal or state common law. a8
Second, the language at issue, as used in the Antiterrorism Amendment,
does not provide for "liability" against the foreign state, it only removes
a jurisdictional barrier to liability. The legislative history of the Antiter-
rorism Amendment confirms this purpose: "This subtitle provides that
nations designated as state sponsors of terrorism under section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 will be amenable to suit in U.S.
courts for terrorist acts. It permits U.S. federal courts to hear claims...
,49 This legislative history reveals that the Antiterrorism Amendment
merely opens the doors of the federal courts but does not provide a cause
of action. In contrast, the Flatow Amendment creates the "liability" by its
own specific terms, which do not explicitly extend to the foreign state.
A more accurate description of the relationship between the Antiter-
rorism Amendment and the Flatow Amendment defines the Flatow
Amendment as intended by Congress to supplement the Antiterrorism
Amendment by enlarging the scope of available damages for plaintiffs
under the Antiterrorism Amendment to include punitive damages as well
as economic damages, solatium, and pain and suffering. These damages
are available only against a specified category of defendants, and the
courts should not infer that Congress intended to provide punitive dam-
46. See Micco, supra note I I.
47. Cronin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
48. In fact, amici asserted this in the Cicippio-Puleo case, 353 F.3d 1024, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
2004), and it is a slippery issue subject to much debate. See also Kilbum v. Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24,
36 (D.D.C. 2003); Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
49. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, at 112 (1996).
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ages against foreign states. Such an enactment could have adverse im-
pacts on foreign relations and complicate the diplomatic efforts of the
executive branch to deal with difficult issues involving foreign state gov-
ernments. 50 Therefore, it seems imprudent for courts to attach punitive
damage liability to foreign states without any legislative history or tex-
tual support in the Flatow Amendment itself to support that construction.
The Cronin court's next reason, that the legislative histories of the
Antiterrorism Amendment and the Flatow Amendment support a cause
of action against a foreign state, is similarly flawed. Although the court's
reading of the legislative history is accurate, it fails to explain why the
courts should infer a cause of action where the legislative text fails to
create one. As just mentioned, the legislative history of the Antiterrorism
Amendment confirms its solely jurisdictional purpose.5' The Cronin
court thought differently: "The stated purposes of the Antiterrorism Act
[are] to deter terrorist acts against U.S. nationals by foreign sovereigns or
their agents and to provide for justice for victims of such terrorism.,, 52 It
is entirely plausible that Congress intended to deter terrorist acts against
U.S. nationals and to provide justice to victims by removing a jurisdic-
tional barrier with the Antiterrorism Amendment, and then followed up
by providing a cause of action (the Flatow Amendment) that allowed
punitive damages only against officials, employees, or agents of a for-
eign state. Intent to provide deterrence and compensation is not incon-
gruous with intent to limit the scope of that compensation as applied to
foreign states; courts need not maximize damage awards for plaintiffs
against all defendants in order to fully realize congressional intent. It is
not unreasonable for Congress to weigh the benefits of providing puni-
tive damages to plaintiffs against the potentially adverse consequences
on foreign relations that may follow from including foreign states in the
category of defendants against whom such judgments would be avail-
able. Viewed in this light, the Flatow Amendment reflects a sensitive
legislative compromise among two important but competing concerns.
The Cronin court then cites the Flatow Amendment's legislative
history to note the purpose of increasing the scope of damages available
to victims of state-sponsored terrorism. 53 Again, there is no reason to
infer from this intent that the category of defendants against whom puni-
tive damages are available extends beyond those defendants specifically
50. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Brief of Amicus
Curiae United States at 5).
51. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
52. Cronin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (citing Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d
97, 106 (D.D.C. 2000)).
53 Id
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named in the text of the Flatow Amendment. The court compounds its
mistake by stating the following:
[T]he purposes of the legislation would clearly be advanced by vic-
tims having a cause of action against the responsible foreign state.
Indeed, to construe the Flatow Amendment as not conferring a pri-
vate cause of action against foreign states would mean that what
Congress gave with one hand in section 1605(a)(7) it immediately
took away with the other in the Flatow Amendment.54
The court incorrectly assumes that Congress somehow "gave" a
cause of action against foreign states with the Antiterrorism Amendment,
which is merely a jurisdictional provision. Congress did not take any-
thing away from victims of international terrorism with the passage of
the Flatow Amendment; in fact, by adding punitive damages, Congress
expanded victims' rights and opportunities. The enlargement of available
remedies is one purpose of the legislation, while another purpose might
be to limit the category of defendants against whom punitive damages
will be available.
Next, the Cronin court insists that "relevant statutory provisions en-
acted after the Flatow Amendment also support the conclusion that the
Amendment gives victims of state-sponsored acts of terrorism a cause of
action against the responsible foreign state. 55 The court cites to the Vic-
tims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, which provides
plaintiffs an avenue to recover damage awards against a foreign state
from the United States government. 56 The court then reasons, "It is in-
conceivable that Congress would enable plaintiffs who obtained judg-
ments against foreign states like Iran to recover the damage awards from
the United States if the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against
the foreign state in the first place. 57
Close analysis reveals the weaknesses in this argument. Even if
plaintiffs do have a cause of action against a foreign state, the Flatow
Amendment is not necessarily the source of that cause of action. Fur-
thermore, it is speculative to draw conclusions about the congressional
intent behind the Flatow Amendment by referring to legislation enacted
four years later by a different Congress.
The Cronin court's analysis of the legislative history behind the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ("Victim's
Protection Act") is similarly unpersuasive:
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing P.L. No. 106-386, § 7101, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000)).
57. Id.
2005] 1039
Seattle University Law Review
Moreover, the legislative history of the Victims Protection Act indi-
cates that Congress presumes the 1996 changes to the FSIA confer[]
a private right of action against foreign states. See, e.g., H.R. Conf.
Rep. 939, 106th C[ong.], 2000 (stating that the 1996 amendments
allowed "American citizens injured or killed in acts of terrorism (or
their survivors) to bring a lawsuit against the terrorist state respon-
sible for that act."); 146 Cong. Rec. S10164-02 (stating that the
1996 amendments "gave American victims of state-sponsored ter-
rorism the right to sue the responsible state."). 58
This legislative history merely restates the obvious fact that the
1996 changes to the FSIA remove a jurisdictional barrier, thereby elimi-
nating the immunity of foreign states for acts of state-sponsored terror-
ism. Even if one reads this language to reveal a Congressional under-
standing that a cause of action against a foreign state exists, this does not
necessarily mean that the Flatow Amendment and the Antiterrorism
Amendment provide a specific cause of action against a foreign state.
Under the Flatow Amendment, plaintiffs may only sue defendants in
their individual capacity. Furthermore, this legislative history is not law,
and even if one reads it as persuasive evidence of congressional intent,
that is only so for the specific law enacted, the Victims Protection Act.59
The court relies on legislative history from a subsequent statute because
the language that should properly govem its interpretation, namely the
text of the Flatow Amendment itself, does not support the result the court
desires.
The Cronin court refers to a 1998 amendment to the FSIA (later re-
pealed) that provided for punitive damages against a foreign state as fur-
ther proof that Congress intended to provide a cause of action against a
foreign state through the Flatow Amendment.60 The court states that it
would be "implausible" for Congress to provide punitive damages
against a foreign state if a cause of action against a foreign state did not
exist in the first place.6' Contrary to the court's conclusion, however, if
the Flatow Amendment does provide a cause of action against a foreign
state, then there would have been no need for the 1998 amendment be-
cause punitive damages would already be available against a foreign
state as provided for in the Flatow Amendment. Therefore, what seems
implausible is the idea that the Flatow Amendment does provide a cause
58. Id. at 232-33.
59. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002,
114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
60. Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Pub. L.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998) ("[A] foreign state except an agency or instrumentality thereof
shall not be liable for punitive damages, except any action under section 1605(a)(7)[J")).
61. Id
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of action against a foreign state. If that were the case, the 1998 amend-
ment would be wholly superfluous because the Flatow Amendment
would have already amended § 1606.62
Other courts have expanded upon the Cronin court's reasoning to
reach the same conclusion regarding interpretation of the Flatow
Amendment.63 In Kilburn v. Islamic Republic of Iran, plaintiff Blake
Kilburn, the brother and only surviving family member of Peter Kilburn,
brought suit against Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Secu-
rity, Libya, and the Libyan External Security Organization for hostage
taking, torture, and extrajudicial killing in violation of international
law.64 The plaintiff alleged that his brother, an American citizen working
as a librarian at the American University of Beirut, was the victim of a
kidnapping and assassination operation.65 The plaintiffs common law
claims included wrongful death, battery, assault, false imprisonment,
slave trafficking, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Kilburn court enumerated six factors for finding that the Fla-
tow Amendment provided a cause of action against a foreign state.66 In
addition to the Cronin court's reasoning, the Kilburn decision cited to the
overwhelming consensus in previous cases that found a cause of action
against a foreign state.67
While the opinions of other courts have some persuasive value,
they are not dispositive, as the Supreme Court has never passed on the
issue and the courts in the D.C. Circuit may choose to deviate from pre-
vious opinions if they are incorrectly decided.68 Furthermore, as noted by
the Roeder court, many of these decisions were rendered against absent
defendants, without the benefit of the adversarial process to put pressure
on the plaintiffs' interpretation of the Flatow Amendment. 69 The Kilburn
court's citation to a congruent decision in the Second Circuit adds little
substance to this argument.7 °
62. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. 2002). This section provides
that foreign states not entitled to immunity under § 1605 or § 1607 "shall not be liable for punitive
damages." Compare the Flatow Amendment: "damages which may include economic damages,
solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those described in sec-
tion 1605(a)(7)." Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 2002)).
63. See, e.g., Kilbum v. Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2003).
64. Id. at 26.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id. at 38-41.
67. Id. at 39-40 (citing Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 231-32
(D.D.C. 2002)).
68. See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
69. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 173 (D.D.C. 2002).
70. Kilburn, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (citing Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F.
Supp. 2d 217, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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The Kilburn court advanced an additional theory based on the ab-
sence of the United States' participation in FSIA cases that involved for-
eign states:
[T]he United States has not intervened in FSIA actions against for-
eign states and attempted to dismiss them on the grounds that the
FSIA does not provide a cause of action against foreign states. Nor
has the United States filed a statement of interest to that effect in
any pending action, even though it is authorized by statute to do
so.
The absence of participation by the United States in these cases is
of minor significance. Silence does not necessarily mean acquiescence,
especially given the United States' involvement in the Roeder case,
where it took the position that the Flatow Amendment does not provide a
cause of action against a foreign state. 72 The Kilburn court's interpreta-
tion of the government's nonparticipation is pure speculation. The United
States may decide whether or not to participate in litigation for a variety
of reasons, including diplomatic and litigation strategy, regardless of
whether the government agrees with a particular court's interpretation of
the law.
C. The Charming Betsy Principle
The courts supporting a broad interpretation of the cause of action
provided by the Flatow Amendment might have argued more persua-
sively by invoking the well-established principle of legal interpretation
announced two centuries ago in the Charming Betsy case. 73 That princi-
ple provides that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. 74 A
court applying this principle to cases involving state-sponsored terrorism
brought under the Antiterrorism Amendment and the Flatow Amendment
might argue that the law of nations makes a state responsible for the acts
of its agents in almost all circumstances where those acts violate interna-
tional law.75 Therefore, the courts should, if possible, construe the Flatow
Amendment consistently with this international law of state responsibil-
ity and hold that it does in fact provide for liability against the foreign
state itself. This construction would require a showing that the Flatow
71. Id. (internal citations omitted).
72. Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
73. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
74. Id.
75. But see Theodore Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifih and the Law of War, 86 A.J.I.L. 1,
16 (1992). Meron's article notes the "basic common law principle respondere non sovereign, an
exception to respondeat superior."
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Amendment is sufficiently ambiguous to allow alternative interpreta-
tions,7 6 because the Charming Betsy principle is merely a principle of
interpretation and cannot help a plaintiff if the meaning of a statute is
clear.77 Given the differing judicial interpretations of the Flatow
Amendment,78 it may not be too difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate
such ambiguity.
Applying the Charming Betsy principle would have been particu-
larly useful in buttressing the respondeat superior argument of the Cronin
court.7 9 This argument, as noted above,80 construed the Antiterrorism
Amendment and the Flatow Amendment together and transposed the re-
spondeat superior principle contained in 1605(a)(7) of the Antiterrorism
Amendment to the Flatow Amendment.8 1 Combining this argument with
the Charming Betsy analysis would provide a firmer basis for finding in
the Flatow Amendment a cause of action against a foreign state itself.
The court could have easily found that the existence of the Antiterrorism
Amendment exception evinces a congressional intent to not shield state
sponsors of terrorism from liability. In keeping with this purpose, the
Flatow Amendment simply supplements and gives more teeth to the An-
titerrorism Amendment, thereby increasing deterrence and accountability
with respect to acts of international terrorism. This approach is more per-
suasive than the Cronin court's focus on the idea that the Flatow
Amendment could be read to "deny" victims of state-sponsored terrorism
a cause of action against a foreign state, an erroneous presumption given
the possibility of state or common law tort claims.8 2
Even if a court considered the Flatow Amendment sufficiently am-
biguous to warrant application of the Charming Betsy principle, a defen-
dant might raise the issue of whether a congressional decision to not hold
a foreign state liable, through the Flatow Amendment, for the acts of its
agents would actually violate an obligatory norm of international law. A
defendant could argue that the Flatow Amendment complies with inter-
national law if it does not provide a cause of action against a foreign
state, although it might violate international law if it explicitly denied a
cause of action against the foreign state.
76. See Att'y General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 128
(2d Cir. 2001).
77. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role ofInternational Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484 (1998).
78. See supra sections Part I.A, B.
79. Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2002).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 232.
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A defendant in this position might caution the court to avoid using
the Charming Betsy principle to redraft the legislation. One academic has
criticized what he terms the "internationalist conception" of the Charm-
ing Betsy principle: "This conception, akin to the monist view of interna-
tional law, might call for essentially rewriting a statute to conform it with
international law, or for construing a statute broadly to mirror interna-
tional law, even if such a construction is not necessary in order to avoid a
violation of international law. ' '83 On these grounds, a defendant in a
state-sponsored terrorism lawsuit should have a plausible objection to
application of the Charming Betsy principle.
D. The Flatow Amendment Does Not Provide a Cause ofAction
Against a Foreign State
Recent judicial opinions finding that the Flatow Amendment pro-
vides a cause of action against a foreign state fail to persuade for a num-
ber of reasons, as discussed above.84 These opinions seem to have mis-
construed both the purpose and the scope of the Flatow Amendment,
given that neither the text of the Amendment nor its legislative history
suggest a cause of action against a foreign state. Accordingly, courts
should not apply the concept of respondeat superior when doing so adds
a category of damages that is explicitly forbidden by the immediately
following section of the FSIA, which provides that foreign states not en-
titled to immunity under § 1605 or § 1607 "shall not be liable for puni-
tive damages. 85 Moreover, requiring explicit statutory language or con-
crete evidence of congressional intent before judicially inserting the lan-
guage "foreign state" into the Flatow Amendment is especially prudent
given the foreign policy concerns that are inherent in state-sponsored
terrorism cases against foreign governments. In this context, judicial
consultation of the executive branch will bring important foreign policy
considerations to the attention of the courts. The expertise of the execu-
tive branch in the arena of foreign policy will help the courts resolve any
ambiguity in the statute.
II. THE BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVE PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION
INVOLVING QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY & SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN U.S. COURTS
If Congress does not act and courts must make the ultimate decision
concerning the Flatow Amendment, they should carefully review the
83. Bradley, supra note 77, at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See supra notes 44-72 and accompanying text.
85.28 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. 2002).
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views of the executive branch with respect to both the legal and the for-
eign policy issues presented by state-sponsored terrorism cases. A court
may then weigh the legitimate foreign policy concerns of the executive
branch against the legitimate interest in justice for victims of state-
sponsored terrorism.
The State Department's participation in a number of cases with for-
eign policy implications inevitably gives rise to the question of how
much deference a court should give to the views of the executive
branch. 86 Since the Tate Letter of 195287 and the passage of the FSIA in
1976, the State Department no longer plays an essential role in determin-
ing questions of foreign sovereign immunity.88 Nevertheless, courts fre-
quently order or invite the State Department to express its views on sov-
ereign immunity or other legal questions in cases that may affect foreign
policy. 89 This section will explore the development of the executive
power over foreign relations as rooted in the Constitution and expressed
in litigation in U.S. courts, and analyze more specifically the benefits of
executive branch participation in cases construing the Flatow Amend-
ment and in other litigation that may affect the conduct of foreign policy.
A. The Constitutional Foundations of the Foreign Relations Power and
the Principle As Developed in U.S. Courts
The foreign relations power of the executive is rooted in the Consti-
tution, particularly Article II, Section 3, which provides that the Presi-
dent shall have the authority to "receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers."9 The Constitution also provides that the President "shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." 91 These
constitutional provisions vest some explicit foreign relations powers in
the executive but do not provide a comprehensive structure of the rela-
tionship between the executive and the judicial branches in the area
where litigation and foreign policy intersect.
Early scholars and statesmen debated the scope of the executive's
power over foreign relations and how it might conflict with the roles of
86. See generally Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002).
87. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Acting U.S. Att'y
General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952). The
Tate Letter sets forth the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, whereby sovereigns are not im-
mune for certain private acts.
88. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983).
89. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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both the legislative and the judicial branches. 92 The jurisprudence in this
area developed from Justice John Marshall's early analysis of constitu-
tional foreign relations issues93 to the leading modem cases of the twen-
tieth century. 94 The Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright described "the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress., 95
The executive branch has often relied on this statement as support for its
theory of presidential power in the area of foreign relations.96 Further-
more, the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright declared that the executive
power over foreign relations was an aspect of sovereignty that passed
directly from the British Crown to the federal government upon the sign-
ing of the Declaration of Independence, and did not depend on any con-
stitutional provision for its legitimacy:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to
conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations
with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as neces-
sary concomitants of nationality. 97
To be sure, this extraconstitutional theory of executive power over
foreign relations has been criticized as having no basis in historical
fact. 98 Regardless of whether Justice Sutherland's account of the origins
of the executive foreign relations power in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright is correct historically, the wisdom of the federal courts' making
92. The most famous debate was between Alexander Hamilton, writing as "Pacificus," and
James Madison, writing as "Helvidius." This debate focused on President Washington's Declaration
of Neutrality (without calling Congress into session) in the war between England and France in
1793. The Pacificus-Helvidius Debate, at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp
?document=429 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) (Hamilton's argument appeared in the Gazette of the
United States, published in Philadelphia, on June 29, 1793. Madison's rebuttal to Hamilton appeared
in a series of articles in the Gazette of the United States between August 24 and September 18,
1793).
93. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177 (1804).
94. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
95. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
96. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); see also Raoul Berger, The Presiden-
tial Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
97. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
98. G. Edward White, What's Wrong with International Law Scholarships: The Historical
Turn in the Constitutional Law of Foreign Relations, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 133, 135 (2000); see also
Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-
Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 13 (1988).
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decisions with foreign policy implications without considering the views
of the executive branch is questionable. Notably, one scholar who criti-
cizes the historical accuracy of the "extraconstitutional" theory of execu-
tive foreign relations power seems to understand the problematic nature
of judicial foreign relations lawmaking:
Even if we assume that the foreign relations powers of the federal
government are "different" from those of its domestic powers-
different because of the historical sources of the federal foreign re-
lations power and the exigencies of international policymaking-it
would seem to be because of the Constitution's expectation that the
Executive (subject to Senate consent) would be the principal organ
of foreign policymaking, and because (if one accepts one version of
history) every international sovereign has some inherent power to
conduct foreign relations. Neither of these grounds justify foreign
relations lawmaking by the federal courts, especially in the absence
of Executive suggestions and in light of the constitutional concerns
raised by Erie about the legitimacy of federal judge-declared law
not grounded in any positive edict of the federal government. 99
The Cronin court's interpretation of the Flatow Amendment exem-
plifies exactly this type of foreign relations lawmaking by the federal
courts. 100 Without any sound basis in statutory interpretation of the
Amendment or in its legislative history, the federal courts have usurped
the role of Congress and created a cause of action against a foreign sov-
ereign in a statute that, on its face, does not provide one. 1°1 The proper
role of the federal courts is to await further congressional action, or to
find some other, legally valid method of compensating plaintiff victims
of state-sponsored terrorism.' 02
The need for the courts to observe their proper constitutional func-
tion is particularly acute in cases touching on areas within the legitimate
sphere of the executive branch's power to conduct diplomatic rela-
tions.10 3 Given that this power is both firmly grounded in the Constitution
99. White, supra note 98, at 138 (discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
100. Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.D.C. 2002).
101. Id. at 233.
102. White's concern about the legitimacy of federal judge-made law not based on any positive
edict of the federal government highlights another troubling recent judicial trend. The federal courts
should not make law on human rights grounds by incorporating non-self-executing treaties or other
non-binding agreements into federal common law in result-driven opinions. See, e.g., Martinez v.
City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
103. U.S. CONST. art. 11.
2005] 1047
Seattle University Law Review
and recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 4 there is no justification for
the lower courts to ignore the foreign relations aspects of cases and/or
legislate from the bench. Considering the views of the executive would
add balance to these cases that often lack the adversarial pressure neces-
sary to reaching a just result, and which are usually headed toward de-
fault judgments.'0 5
Recognizing the legitimate interests of the executive branch in liti-
gation affecting foreign policy, several modem courts have requested the
views of the State Department in appropriate cases.' 0 6 In Kadic v.
Karadzic, plaintiffs brought an action against the leader of a self-
proclaimed republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, asserting causes of ac-
tion for genocide; rape; forced prostitution; torture and other cruel, in-
human and degrading treatment; assault and battery; gender and ethnic
inequality; summary execution; and wrongful death. 0 7 The plaintiffs'
claims arose from a systematic campaign of atrocities carried out by
military forces during the course of the Bosnian civil war.' 0 8 The court
addressed the defendant's potential immunity from service of process, as
an invitee of the United Nations while in the United States, and the ap-
plicability of the political question doctrine.'0 9 The Kadic court charac-
terized the views of the executive as "entitled to respectful considera-
tion" and wrote to the attorney general to inquire whether the United
States desired to offer any of its views on the issues raised in the case. 10
The response, signed by the solicitor general and the Legal Adviser of
the State Department, indicated that the political question doctrine should
not prevent litigation of the case."' The government's position in Kadic
demonstrates that the United States will not always suggest immunity or
otherwise attempt to protect a defendant.
The Sarei v. Rio Tinto court recognized the appropriateness of giv-
ing strong consideration to the views of the State Department." 2 The
plaintiffs in Rio Tinto were current and former residents of the Island of
104. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see also supra
notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
105. See Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (D.D.C. 2002).
106. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. filed June 19, 2001); Sarei v. Rio
Tinto P.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250
(2nd Cir. 1995).
107. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 250.
110. Id.
111. An earlier letter signed by Michael J. Habib, Director of Eastern European Affairs for the
State Department, had indicated that Karadzic was not immune from service of process as an invitee
of the United Nations. Id.
112. Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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Bougainville in Papua New Guinea who filed a class action against an
Australian corporation and a British corporation under the ATCA.113 The
plaintiffs alleged that the corporations committed crimes against human-
ity and war crimes and that the corporations' mining operations de-
stroyed the environment, damaged the health of the people, and incited a
civil war. 1 4 The court noted the views of the State Department Legal
Adviser on the foreign relations impact of the case: "Specifically, Mr.
Taft stated that continued adjudication of this lawsuit 'would risk a po-
tentially serious adverse impact on the [Bougainville] peace process, and
hence on the conduct of [United States] foreign relations. ' ' ' 1.5 The court
explained that the State Department's views regarding the impact of the
litigation on U.S. foreign policy are to be considered conclusive and can-
not be litigated without violating settled separation of powers princi-
ples. 16 As such, the court rejected the plaintiffs' request that it disregard
the Statement of the Legal Adviser.1 17 Ultimately, the court held that the
act of state doctrine and the political question doctrine required dismissal
of plaintiffs' claims.' 18 Regardless of whether the court reached the cor-
rect result in this particular case, the court showed appropriate deference
to the State Department's position. 19
B. The Legitimate Interests of the Executive and the Benefits of Executive
Participation in Litigation That Affects Foreign Policy
There is practical wisdom underlying executive participation in liti-
gation that affects foreign policy. To begin with, the attorneys at the
State Department and the Department of Justice are capable of providing
sound, persuasive, and unique legal arguments, helpful for consideration
of complex legal issues by the courts. On this basis alone, the federal
courts should consider the views of the executive branch when address-
ing issues of statutory interpretation and international law.
Furthermore, careful consideration of the views of the executive by
the federal courts is particularly appropriate given the current state of
judicial activism in human rights and state-sponsored terrorism cases. 120
113. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
114. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
115. Id at 1181.
116. Id. at 1181-82.
117. Id. at 1192.
118. Id. at 1208-09.
119. The State Department did not take a position on whether or not the act of state or political
question doctrines required dismissal of the case. The State Department only weighed in on the
foreign policy issues in the case, and the court correctly considered the State Department's view on
that matter conclusive.
120. See Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.D.C. 2002).
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Such consideration will provide deeper insight into the foreign policy
implications of decisions that seem morally justifiable on human rights
grounds, but may prove unwise in the long term from a foreign policy or
a human rights perspective, decisions that, as demonstrated in the line of
cases interpreting the Flatow Amendment, are supported by creative yet
questionable legal reasoning. Considering the long-range foreign policy
and human rights implications of a decision alongside each other will
provide a balanced approach to judicial analysis of both legal and nonle-
gal ramifications of particular cases.
State-sponsored terrorism lawsuits in particular have the potential
to interfere with the legitimate interests of the executive branch in con-
ducting foreign policy. The executive branch faces the sensitive and of-
ten difficult task of conducting diplomatic relations, a task that is espe-
cially challenging when conducted with potentially dangerous states.'2 '
Lawsuits in U.S. courts frequently result in default judgments against the
foreign state, and judgment enforcement is difficult and potentially trou-
blesome. 122 Indeed, enforcement of default judgments might involve pay-
ing plaintiffs from frozen assets of the foreign state defendant.' 23 This
practice would reduce executive leverage over rogue states, as one com-
mentator has noted:
In practice, frozen assets have proven useful as "diplomatic bargain-
ing chips" to encourage a government to cooperate or to reward re-
gime change. For example, former deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart
Eizenstat noted that "the leverage provided by approximately $350
million in blocked assets. . . played an important role in persuading
Vietnam's leadership to address important U.S. concerns in the
normalization process," including accounting for POWs and MIAs
from the Vietnam War. 124
Another prominent example is the resolution of the Iran hostage-
taking crisis in 1980: "Several officials noted in a joint statement to Con-
gress that 'the critical bargaining chip' in the Iran Hostage Crisis was the
$10 billion in assets that had been blocked after the U.S. embassy was
taken.' 25 If default judgments awarded by courts are satisfied from fro-
zen assets of rogue states, the executive branch will lose a valuable tool
in the conduct of foreign relations.
121. For example, the task of improving relations with Iran and Libya.
122. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).
123. See Allison Taylor, Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems with Recent
Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 545 (2003).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 545 n.131 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 106-733, at 13-14 (2000) (Joint testimony of
Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, Defense Department Undersecretary for Policy Wal-
ter Slocombe, and State Department Undersecretary for Policy Thomas Pickering)).
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Large default judgments may also hinder U.S. efforts to normalize
relations with rogue states. As one author has predicted with respect to
Cuba and Iran, "outstanding judgments under the 1996 amendments
could retard the improvement of relations between the United States and
countries such as Cuba and Iran. Large unresolved claims against an
economically strapped state struggling to implement democracy may not
be in the foreign policy interest of the United States."' 126 By awarding
large default judgments against foreign states, courts interfere with the
executive branch's efforts to promote democracy. Thus, default judg-
ments may encourage extremism and terrorism by inhibiting political and
ideological change in rogue states, with the possible consequence of pro-
ducing the opposite result from that intended by the courts.
In reality, the courts' imposition of default judgments poses not
only a technical obstacle to normalizing relations 2 and promoting de-
mocracy in rogue states, but a psychological obstacle as well. It is not
hard to imagine the reaction of Iranian government officials when learn-
ing that a U.S. court has rendered an enormous default judgment against
its nation. The international community "has generally resisted U.S. as-
sertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in such realms as employment law,
antitrust law, and export controls."'' 28 The international community will
further resist U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in tort claims cases that
result in staggering default judgments. The symbolic meaning of these
judgments, while highly touted and valued by plaintiffs, is surely not lost
on the foreign state defendants, whose strong resentment might be fairly
presumed.
Indeed, such resentment may encourage foreign states to retaliate
against the United States with indictments for terrorism in their own
courts. In fact, one commentator has observed that "we have also terror-
ized large swaths of the world through decades of military interventions
and support for terrorist regimes and organizations.', 29 At least two na-
tions, Iran and Cuba, have already retaliated against the U.S. by provid-
ing for lawsuits against the United States in their courts. 30 Iran's legisla-
tion allows "Iranian 'victims of U.S. interference' to sue the United
States for damages."'f3' As frustration with America and the perceived
126. Glannon, supra note 8, at 700.
127. Including trade relations-presumably Iran would prefer to engage in commerce with
nations that provide a more secure environment for investment.
128. Glannon, supra note 8, at 706.
129. Beth Stephens, Accountability Without Hypocrisy: Consistent Standards, Honest History,
36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 919, 922 (2002).
130. See Taylor, supra note 123, at 549-50.
131. Id. at 549 (quoting Iran's MPs Cry "Down With America," Approve Lawsuits Against the
United States, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 1, 2000).
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arrogance of U.S. courts increases abroad, other nations might follow
Iran's example. Such lawsuits would threaten U.S. diplomatic property
abroad, which is valued at $12 billion to $15 billion.132 While this figure
is nothing to smirk at, the true cost of retaliation or reciprocity must also
include the damage to already challenging relationships with rogue
states, and as such cannot be realistically assigned a dollar value.
The category of lawsuits with potentially damaging foreign policy
implications is not limited to those filed directly against a foreign gov-
ernment, but may include those involving judicial scrutiny of the actions
of a foreign government. In the Exxon Mobil case, for example, adjudica-
tion of the dispute might involve judicial criticism of Indonesian military
conduct, which Indonesia may consider an affront to its sovereignty. 33
Angering Indonesia could affect its participation in the war on terror-
ism. 34 Considering the importance of Indonesia as a key Islamic nation
identified as a "focal point" for efforts against Al Qaeda, courts should
consider the risk of damage to diplomatic relations with that nation. 135
Additionally, adjudication of the lawsuit could "diminish our ability to
work with the Government of Indonesia . . . on a variety of important
programs, including efforts to promote human rights in Indonesia."'136
While these concerns do not necessarily mandate dismissal of the case,
the courts should give them considerable weight. 37
The Roeder case highlights yet another potentially troubling foreign
policy issue raised by state-sponsored terrorism lawsuits: interference
with U.S. treaty obligations and executive agreements. 138 The power of
the executive to enter into agreements extinguishing the claims of U.S.
nationals against foreign governments was recently restated by the Su-
preme Court: "Given the fact that the practice goes back over 200 years
to the first Presidential administration, and has received congressional
acquiescence throughout its history, the conclusion '[t]hat the President's
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control of foreign relations includes the settlement of claims is indisput-
able."",139 In Roeder, the plaintiffs' lawsuit, which arose out of the 1979
hostage crisis at the American Embassy in Tehran, attempted to circum-
vent the Algiers Accords, which had been negotiated with Iran to secure
the release of the hostages. 40 Despite congressional interference with the
litigation, 14 1 the court determined that Congress had not abrogated the
Algiers Accords, and thus plaintiffs could not proceed. In so deciding,
the court recognized the limitations of its mandate and its expertise:
"There are two branches of government that are empowered to abrogate
and rescind the Algiers Accords, and the judiciary is not one of them.
The political considerations that must be balanced prior to such a deci-
sion are beyond both the expertise and the mandate of this Court."' 142 The
executive branch appropriately provided the expertise the court lacked. 143
Had the executive branch not intervened in Roeder, the court might have
rendered a judgment in direct conflict with an international obligation of
the United States. Both the executive branch's knowledge of the Algiers
Accords and its unique legal expertise in international law were crucial
to the court's reaching the correct result in Roeder.144 Therefore, the
Roeder case demonstrates the wisdom of courts giving careful considera-
tion to the views of the State Department in cases involving foreign pol-
icy issues and questions of international law.
III. CONCLUSION: KEEPING AN EYE ON THE LATEST DECISIONS AND
ANY (PERHAPS RELATED) MOVEMENTS IN CONGRESS
The D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Cicippio-Puleo45 may resolve
some of the controversy surrounding interpretation of the Flatow
Amendment, or it may add fuel to the fire. At least for the moment, a
narrower interpretation of the Flatow Amendment has gained momen-
tum.146 The D.C. Circuit stated, "The ultimate question is one of Con-
gressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve
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upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."' 147 While the
issue of congressional intent behind the Flatow Amendment remains
open to debate, the plain language of the statute supports the narrower
interpretation properly adopted by the court. 148 The courts should heed
the advice of the D.C. Circuit and approach the issue with a proper
measure of objectivity and judicial restraint:
Clearly, Congress's authorization of a cause of action against offi-
cials, employees, and agents of a foreign state was a significant step
toward providing a judicial forum for the compensation of terrorist
victims. Recognizing a federal cause of action against foreign states
undoubtedly would be an even greater step toward that end, but it is
a step that Congress has yet to take. And it is for Congress, not the
courts, to decide whether a cause of action should lie against foreign
states. 149
If Congress believes that the D.C. Circuit misinterpreted the Flatow
Amendment in Cicippio-Puleo, it may choose to clarify the issue by fur-
ther legislation. Indeed, such a development would not be surprising,
given the strong interest of Congress in providing meaningful access to
justice for victims of terrorism and other egregious human rights viola-
tions, as opposed to the foreign policy concerns adduced in the second
part of this paper.
Nonetheless, a recently proposed resolution in the House of Repre-
sentatives, while not explicitly related to the line of cases interpreting the
Flatow Amendment, seems to cut the other way. The text of the newly
proposed resolution states, in relevant part:
Whereas it is the appropriate judicial role to faithfully interpret the
expression of the popular will through laws enacted by duly elected
representatives of the American people and our system of checks
and balances;
Whereas Americans should not have to look for guidance on how to
live their lives from the often contradictory decisions of any of hun-
dreds of other foreign organizations; and
Whereas inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign judgments, laws,
or pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of the United States,
the separation of powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-
making authority: Now, therefore, be it
147. Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 578 (1979)).
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Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that
judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the
United States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments,
laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign
judgments, laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legis-
lative history of laws passed by the elected legislative branches of
the United States or otherwise inform an understanding of the origi-
nal meaning of the laws of the United States. 150
This resolution was referred to the House Subcommittee on the Ju-
diciary on March 17, 2004, and referred to the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security on March 19, 2004. The text of the
proposed resolution demonstrates Congress's frustration with judicial
reliance on international sources of law that have not been affirmatively
incorporated into U.S. law through the appropriate legislative channels.
Arguably, this congressional frustration will be exacerbated if the courts
use the Charming Betsy principle to bring nonincorporated international
law into analysis of the Flatow Amendment and the Antiterrorism
Amendment. On the other hand, if Congress did in fact intend the Flatow
Amendment to apply to foreign states, then the Charming Betsy principle
may help hold states liable for the acts of their agents under the respon-
deat superior principle.
The most recent decision in the D.C. Circuit provides the better
statutory analysis of the Flatow Amendment.' 5' By contrast, the Cronin
opinion is a prime example of judicial usurpation. 152 First, it usurps the
legislative power by creating a cause of action not supported by the statu-
tory language, thereby replacing the democratically enacted text with
judicially created federal law.153 Second, it interferes with the executive
power by intruding into foreign affairs. 54
150. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004). There were fifty-nine sponsors of this resolution.
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